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This fix prevents a potential attack using intentional packet reordering to
initialize more than one session with using the same handshake keys, leading
to more that one session to be initialized with the same key data altogether,
allowing to decrypt some packets in the worst case.
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state can be used; remove the concept of temporary peers
These changes will fix the possibility of a TCP-SYN-Flood-like DoS attack, at the cost of another
protocol change: as we can't count request IDs when we don't know have temporary peers, request IDs
are removed completely.
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commit.
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don't actually use any of is code
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handshakes, but request a re-handshake
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memory corruption etc. found by Valgrind
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most of the config file parser
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crypto implementation
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